Justice Mohsin Akhtar Kayani’s Resignation: Judi...

Summary

• Constitutional Amendments and Judicial Independence: Judicial independence is not a privilege enjoyed by judges; it is a constitutional safeguard designed to protect citizens against arbitrary governmental authority.
• Although their individual circumstances were not identical, their departures raise an important question: have constitutional amendments intended to reorganise judicial governance weakened the institutional safeguards necessary for an independent judiciary—a question that Justice Kayani appears to have confronted a year later?
• Judicial independence is not a professional privilege of judges; it is the citizen’s ultimate constitutional protection against the arbitrary exercise of state power.

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By Muhammad Imran, Staff Member, SAHSOL-LUMS Maria Batool, SAHSOL Graduate-2025 Muhammad Ameer Hamza, Final Year Law Student, SLC

An Early Departure from Judicial Office: Justice Mohsin Akhtar Kayani’s resignation on 28 October 2026, reportedly citing personal health concerns and, more significantly, reasons of conscience, marks an important moment in Pakistan’s constitutional debate. His decision to relinquish judicial office well before his scheduled retirement on 10 February 2032 raises serious questions about judicial independence and the institutional consequences of the 26th and 27th Constitutional Amendments.

In his resignation letter to the President, Justice Kayani reflected on his judicial career, highlighting the disposal of more than 23,000 cases and his commitment to constitutional supremacy, fundamental rights and the administration of justice without fear or favour. More significantly, he maintained that the 26th and 27th Constitutional Amendments had compromised the independence and institutional integrity of the High Courts. He also expressed concern over growing executive influence in judicial appointments and transfers, arguing that these developments had undermined public confidence in judicial independence.

Constitutional Amendments and Judicial Independence: Judicial independence is not a privilege enjoyed by judges; it is a constitutional safeguard designed to protect citizens against arbitrary governmental authority. Its legitimacy rests upon the judiciary’s ability to exercise judicial power independently and impartially, free from institutional and political pressure.

Justice Kayani’s resignation becomes particularly significant when examined alongside the earlier departures of Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Justice Athar Minallah. Their resignations following the 26th Constitutional Amendment reflected serious reservations about the restructuring of the judicial system. Although their individual circumstances were not identical, their departures raise an important question: have constitutional amendments intended to reorganise judicial governance weakened the institutional safeguards necessary for an independent judiciary—a question that Justice Kayani appears to have confronted a year later?

The distinction between constitutional amendments and constitutional development is particularly relevant. The authority to amend the Constitution does not automatically establish the institutional wisdom of every constitutional change. Constitutional reform must strengthen democratic institutions, preserve the separation of powers and reinforce judicial independence. Its practical consequences must therefore be evaluated against the foundational principles of constitutionalism.