At BRICS, India must bank on the NDB

On September 12, leaders of the BRICS grouping gathered at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi, with India holding the chair and, by extension, the pen. When BRICS came together in 2011, its five members contributed 20% of global GDP but held just 11% of the voting share at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Today, the expanded grouping accounts for nearly 40% of global GDP and 55% of the world’s population, but the voting share has barely expanded.

Beyond that grievance, BRICS does not, and will never, possess a coherent geopolitical identity. Russia, China and Iran would like it to be anti-West, while India, Brazil and South Africa insist it is better understood as non-West. Given these divergences and the importance of the India-U.S. ties, Delhi cannot lend itself to the Beijing-Moscow de-dollarisation crusade. Not only would that add fuel to the fire at a time when ties with Washington are already strained, but it would also be an unsustainable proposition to advocate in the medium term.

India’s approach to BRICS has to conform to the broader constraints and contradictions that its membership poses — maximising the grouping’s potential without strengthening Beijing’s overall strategic position. Within these constraints, there are still possibilities to keep the grouping relevant.

Making the NDB count

One area where BRICS can contribute the most meaningfully to the global financial order, without overtly threatening or challenging American predominance, is by expanding the efficiency and membership of the New Development Bank (NDB). Established by the BRICS countries in 2015 to “mobilise resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging markets and developing countries,” the bank remains one of the grouping’s most tangible tools.